A proposal for a pragmatic virtue theory

Loosely, Aristotle’s virtue theory can be outlined as follows:

Virtuous actions are actions performed by virtuous people.
Virtuous people are those who act virtuously.

It’s obviously circular, but that’s not the point. Aristotle is trying to root virtue in a particular kind of being, or way of living. In this respect he is ahead of his time. Unlike the likes of Kant and Mill, who thought that virtuous acts could be calculated for every situation, he thinks that the most ethical course of action is determined intuitively, and prior to the moment, by the condition of already having a virtuous predisposition. Such a disposition is arrived at by the pursuit of practical and intellectual knowledge, and practice, and or repetition. The problem arises when we ask ourselves how we ought to model this disposition. Aristotle argued that we should appeal to our elders and prior experience, but where do we turn to in a world where social science has demonstrated to us that we should not necessarily trust our elders, and that we should not trust our experience sans reflection – in other words, a world without neutral knowledge. I think this dilemma can be resolved by appealing to a pragmatic virtue theory. The best we can do is what we ought to do, and fortunately for us we live in a world in which our elders have outlined the prior mentioned dilemma. So we add the clause, “question one’s elders, and act reflexively,” to our already long list of clauses that cultivate a virtuous being. Such is the reality that a virtuous person must navigate in this day and age. Thus the clauses that constitute a virtuous person are constantly in flux, and different depending on our point in history. The elders of our day, or the experts and scholars that came before us, are our source for virtue like every generation prior to ours, except the things they say have changed. The usefulness of the development of a cohesive social science is evident here to the development of past and future virtuous ways of living. Finally there is still a particularity to such an approach, and which, I believe, forces me to side with Rorty and his notions on ethnocentrism. We simply can’t escape our context, but are obliged to act in the best way we see fit, taking into consideration the things we can. I think there is some interesting work to be done concerning an ethics which includes the clauses I listed above – should we call it a sceptical virtue theory instead, and can we justify that such an approach is preferable to one that doesn’t include a hefty dose of questioning? In other words can questioning, or a critical disposition, be virtuous? I at least like to think so.

Existentialism made me do it

Existentialism got me in trouble on the weekend. Although I’m something of an existentialist myself, whenever anyone else claims to be one, I gag. “How cliché,” I mumble to myself. Existentialism is supposed to be a dark secret you brew about alone in the privacy of your own home, and or with the occasional woman that spends the night and likes to talk after sex. Why is this? Because existentialism ain’t much. It blows my mind to think that there is actually a school espousing such prophecy. Existentialism is kind of like scepticism; if you actually abide by it then you aren’t being very existential (this from a guy that regularly attends an anarchist reading circle). Essentially it is the philosophy of being for the sake of being – and this being can be manifest however you see fit. So if you tell me you’re an existentialist you aren’t telling me much. All your saying is that you have nothing useful to propose about yourself or anything else, except you are aware of your “Being” and this makes you better than everyone else at the party. Next time I’ll snap back with a “well I’m an alchoholisist, and I drink for the sake of drinking, but I am aware of and embrace my problem”… or maybe I'll save that for the AA meeting.

Finally what spurred me to write this post? Even though it’s not even 10am yet, I’m pretty sure I’ve already experienced the highlight of my day in this post over at the weblog.

Survival and teleology

“For an organism is self-maintaining, self-developing and self-reproducing structure, and that is to be essentially a teleological unit.”

No it isn’t! The excerpt is from a lousy antiquated text I have to read for my metaphysics class. I’m tired of people assuming that from survival follows teleology. The logical conclusion of this kind of reasoning is that there is some kind of teleology to evolution.

I haven’t been very clear. There is nothing intrinsically teleological to an organism, not even a will to survive – no matter what some folks seem to think. It may be the case that some organism have a will to survive, and there could be considerable work done in regards to expanding on and explaining this, but to say species such as squirrels are inherently survival inclined is as foolish as saying that species such as humans are naturally motivated, or not lazy. It is simply the case that most of the squirrels we come into contact with have survived (no kidding), and those that lacked this ‘nature’ just didn’t survive. It’s a conflation of genus and universals otherwise, and then attributing final cause to them. In laymen’s terms, we are circling the shots in the barn door after we fired them, and claiming to be perfect shots. If it follows that there are teleological ends to everyday organisms like squirrels, it is not much of a stretch to claim such ends for other organic entities such as the world, solar system, and universe. Outside of a theological explanation, such an appeal is quite obviously foolish. Which brings me to Darwin and the theory of evolution, and why I think it’s important we stop misinterpreting it. It is controversial because it allows us to deny teleology. This is why those that try and attribute 'whys' to things like being (religious folk mostly) have such a problem with it. Unfortunately it is very rarely read as such, except by those in the field. Survival is based on coincidence, and or circumstance, rather than nature, or teleology.

I'm still not clear I was very clear.