The “interpreter effect” and Punk, and moving forward

When I was writing the preceding post I had a second criticism in mind that I didn’t bother putting down. Today I was doing some readings for a class of mine and I came across this: “Cultural unity or disunity is in large part a function of the vocabulary and the theoretical presuppositions of the investigator” (Author’s italics, 17). While reading Clark’s article I couldn’t help but get the impression he was overlooking this. Perhaps he was a punk at one time – perhaps he’d still like to think himself one. Maybe he’s simply met so many self-declared punk rockers that he felt there must be some promising commonality called “Punk” that bound them together. My point is that he seemed to presuppose it, then seek evidence of its coherence wherever he could. Furthermore, once he had set this procedure into motion, it was as if punk had actually been revived – as if his declaring its life in death actually succeeded in resurrecting it. But did we really need a cultural theorist to do this for us? I mean there’s enough kids out there calling themselves punk and desperately cutting and pasting their own renditions together, that if all we need is a presupposition of its existence, Punk is alive and well. However this Punk, as a hack job semiology or bricolage, seems to hardly ‘live’ up to the kind of radical promise proposed by Clark’s version. Since when has re-arranging cultural signifiers been enough?

So what in my mind’s eye would have constituted a satisfactory account? The “interpreter effect” threatens more than just a coherent articulation of Punk; it threatens any claim to cultural cohesion in general. It certainly begs the necessity for reflexivity. “The investigator, as well as the conceptual apparatus he or she brings to the study, must be considered as an active factor … in understanding what culture is…” (23) If this is the case, what are we left with? According to Neil J. Smelser, the author who I’ve been quoting here, there are four other features of a good culture description. First, pragmatism, the piece “should be assed primarily on its explanatory adequacy or its usefulness as an explanatory element…” (23) Second, such conceptualizations, though heuristic, need not be arbitrary; they can and should correlate with observable data. In this way “culture becomes similar to a hypothesis” (24). Fourth, particularization, it should not be treated any more then is necessary as a “global entity.” Rather it should be “disegregated into discreet parts” (24). Finally, it should be prepared to give an account of its potential for incoherence, and assume that such a potential is already in play – that is to say, “one should identify the whole range of individual and social pressures and tendencies that work to present the culture as more coherent or less coherent then it appears” (Author’s italics, 25).

Cited:
Smelser, Neil J. “Culture: Coherent or Incoherent,” in _Thoery of Culture_. Ed. Richard Munch and Neil J. Smelser. Berkley: University of California Press, 1992. Pages 3-28.